CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927 — Page 124

138

the Municipality and by the Foreign Consular Body there.

On this point the Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs had already asked for further information.

(Foreign Office telegram No.27 of February 3rd to Sir

S. Barton).

Thus,

while the particular emergency for which

the troops had been despatched had not arisen at Shanghai,

all the British representatives in China (with the

exception of Mr. Teichman, of the Peking Legation, who is

at Hankow with Mr. O'Malley but whose views Wr. O'Melley

does not support) appeared to be opposed to any

diversion of troops on the basis of possible assurances

by Eugene Chen; but the Japanese and United States

Governments, whom the Cabinet were anxious not to

antagonise, were apprehensive as to the possible

reactions of a landing of our troops at Shanghai.

with reference to the phrase in Mr. O'Malley's

telegram No.234, quoted in (6) above, the Secretary of

tate for Foreign Affairs said that there could be no

question of the Government gambling in the lives of the

British at Shanghai. There was already at Shanghai a

force of 4,000 men - the number considered necessary to

control the mob; the troops had been sent because of the

danger of an immediate advance on Shanghai by the

Nationalist Armies; but whilst our advance troops were now

in Far Eastern waters, the Nationalist Army was no nearer

to Shanghai.

As regards the signature of the agreement and the

guarantee, the Secretary of State explained that his view

was that throughout the negotiations there had been a

struggle between Borodin and the Bolshevist influences on

the one side, who were opposed to any agreement, and the

more mo derate opinion, represented by Chen, which desired

to accept so liberal an offer. The value of the

conclusion of the agreement would lie in the proof that the

Moderat